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Abstract—Decision making in uncertain and risky environ-
ments is a prominent area of research. Standard economic
theories fail to fully explain human behaviour, while a potentially
promising alternative may lie in the direction of Reinforcement
Learning (RL) theory. We analyse data for 46 players extracted
from a financial market online game and test whether Rein-
forcement Learning (Q-Learning) could capture these players
behaviour using a risk measure based on financial modeling.
Moreover we test an earlier hypothesis that players are “naı¨ve”
(short-sighted). Our results indicate that a simple Reinforcement
Learning model which considers only the selling component of the
task captures the decision-making process for a subset of players
but this is not sufficient to draw any conclusion on the population.
We also find that there is not a significant improvement of fitting
of the players when using a full RL model against a myopic
version, where only immediate reward is valued by the players.
This indicates that players, if using a Reinforcement Learning
approach, do so naı¨vely.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most challenging fields of research is human
decision-making. Understanding the processes involved and
trying to predict or replicate behaviours has been, historically,
the ultimate goal of many disciplines. Economics for example,
has a long tradition of trying to formalise human behaviour
into descriptive or normative models. These models have
been employed for several years (e.g. Expected Utility model
[1]) but have been proven to be inadequate [2]–[5], giving
rise to new research areas like behavioural and experimental
economics. Psychology as well, is natively concerned with
decision-making. Sequential decision problems have been used
to evaluate people’s risk attitude, in order to predict actual risk
proneness in real life scenarios [6]–[8]. While economics and
psychology are focused on the high-level manifestations and
implications of decision-making, neuroscience aims at under-
standing the biological machinery and the neural processes
behind human (or animal) behaviour [9]–[15].
Recently these fields of research have started to collaborate,
contributing to the rise of an emerging multi-disciplinary field
called neuroeconomics [16]–[20]. This discipline approaches
the problem from several perspectives and on different levels
of abstraction. RL is a theoretical framework [21], exten-
sively used in neuroeconomics literature for addressing a wide
array of problems involving learning in partially observable
environments [22]–[27]. RL is based on the concept of re-
ward/punishment for the actions taken. The agents act in an
environment of which they possess only partial knowledge.
To be able to achieve the best behaviour, i.e. maximise their
reward, the agents have to learn through experience and update
their beliefs. Learning happens as a result of the agent’s
interpretation of the interactions with its surroundings and the
consequences of a “reward” feedback signal. The ability of this
framework to model and therefore understand behavioural data
and its underlying neural implications, is of pivotal importance
in decision making [28].
RL can accurately capture human and animal learning
patterns and has been proven effective at describing the
functioning of some areas of the human brain, like the
basal ganglia, and the functions of neurotransmitters such
as dopamine [22], [29]–[31]. One of the most remarkable
similarities between biological functioning and RL models
is the one about Temporal Difference (TD) error [21], [32]–
[34] and the activation of mid-brain dopamine neurons [35]–
[40]. These findings supported the notion that TD Learning is
implemented in the brain with dopaminergic neurons in the
striatum [29], [34], [41]–[50], [78], making it a reasonable
first choice for a modelling attempt. Humans and animals are
very advanced signal detectors whose behaviour is susceptible
to changes in the rewards resulting from their choices [51],
[52]. Both neuroscience and psychology have extensively
employed tasks in which the exploration-exploitation trade-
off was of crucial importance [20], [53]–[56]. It is crucial for
the individuals to maximise their reward using the information
at their disposal but to do so advantageously they need to
learn which actions lead to better rewards. Decision making
in uncertain environments is a challenging problem because of
the competing importance of the two strategies: exploitation
is, of course, the best course of action, but only when enough
knowledge about the quality of the actions is available, while
exploration increases the knowledge about the environment.
A complicated task that encompasses all these features is
stocks selection in financial markets, where investors have
to choose among hundreds of possible securities to create
their portfolio. Stock trends are non-monotonic because they
are not guaranteed to achieve a global maximum and the
future distribution of reward is intrinsically stochastic. After
purchasing a stock, investors are faced with the decisions on
when to sell it (Market timing problem [56]). To be able to
achieve the best return from their investments, people need
to be careful in considering how to maximise their profit in
the long term and not only in a single episode. We speculate
that RL is part of the decision making process for investors.
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Fig. 1. Models comparisons. Figure (a) shows the goodness of fit (Maximum Likelihood Estimate) of the myopic model (2 free parameters, with γ = 0)
against the random model. Each bar represents the corresponding player’s MLE while the hollow diamond represents the MLE of the random model. The height
of the bars differs greatly as the players have different amount of transactions. The asterisks indicate the players better fitted by the myopic version of our RL
model as opposed to a random model. For 15% of the players the myopic model fits better than random (players 11, 18, 28, 31, 33, 37, 42 with p-value < 0.05
calculated with the Likelihood ratio χ2 test at 95% confidence level). Figure (b) shows the same comparison, this time with the result of the Likelihood Ratio
Test portrayed on the y-axis. The horizontal line represent the threshold (critical value) for statistical significance which depends on the degrees of freedom. For
myopic model versus random dof = 2 and critical value is 5.991. Figures (c) and (d) show the comparison for the fitting of the full RL (3 free parameters)
model against the simpler version (γ = 0) model. In (c) each bar represent a player’s full RL model MLE while the filled diamond represents the MLE of the
myopic model. Players who are better fitted by a full model are marked with an asterisk (statistically significant at 95% confidence with the same test as the
previous comparison). Even if there is a statistical improvement in the fitting for 6 players (12, 14, 30, 39, 40, 44) this does not translate in a better overall
performance of the full RL model when it is compared to the random model. Figures (e) and (f) show this comparison. The full RL fits better than random
for 7 players (11, 14, 18, 28, 31, 39, 42). Some of these are already captured by the simpler model, only two (14 and 39) were not already captured by the
myopic model. At the same time the full model loses two players (33 and 37). This is due to the fact that this comparison has a higher critical value (7.815 with
dof = 3). These results have been tested for the entire population using Binomial Proportion Confidence Intervals calculated with Clopper-Pearson method, the
results are negative as only 7 out of 46 players are better than random (Fig. 3 in the Appendix)
This speculation is supported by Choi et al. [57], who studied
individual investors decisions on 401(k) savings plans. Over
the years, investors could decide to increase or decrease the
percentage of their salary to commit to this retirement plan.
Their results suggest that investors’ decisions are influenced
by personal experiences: they show that those investors who
have experienced a positive reward from previous investment
in their 401(k) fund, tend to increase the investment in that
particular product, compared to those who experienced a lower
reward outcome. This kind of behaviour follows a “naı¨ve
reinforcement learning” and is in contrast with the disposi-
tion effect [59], [65](the unwillingness of investors to sell
“losing” investments). Huang et al. investigated how personal
experience in investments affects future decisions about the
selection of stocks [58]. They used data that spans from 1991
to 1996, from a large discount broker. Again, the pattern of
repurchasing financial product which yielded positive return
was found. As Huang suggests, by understanding the way past
experience affects investors’ decisions, it might be possible
to make predictions about the financial markets involved. RL
has also been used, with promising results, to develop Stock
Market Trading Systems [60]–[63] and to build Agent Based
Stock Market Simulations [64]. While these works use RL
to predict future prices, they do not try to describe human
behaviour. With these notions as background we decided to
investigate and try to model human choices in a stochastic,
non-stationary environment. We hypothesise that RL is a
component of decision making and to test this we compare
two RL models against a purely random one. Our modelling
attempts are based on two assumptions. First, we assume that
risk is a proxy of the internal representation of the actions
for some players. To test this we use a measure of systematic
risk widely used in finance and economics to categorise the
different choices into three discrete classes. We also assume
that the reward signal is based on the cash income arising
from the sales an investor makes. This assumption follows a
widely researched behaviour referred to as “disposition effect”
in literature [59], [65], the tendency of individual investors to
sell stocks which increased in value since when they were
purchased, while holding onto the stocks which lost value.
This phenomenon is stronger for individual investors but it
also exhibited by institutional investors, such as mutual funds
Fig. 2. Comparison of the ranked vs scrambled discretisation. Test for
the assumption that investors use risk to internally classify the different
stocks in discrete degrees of risk. The errorbars represent the probability and
99% confidence intervals of the comparison of the stock discretisation based
on the βF risk measure as opposed to 500 randomly generated scrambled
discretisations. The 7 players for which the RL model outperformed the
random model all have a statistically significative probability of using a
representation of actions discretisation based on risk. The comparison of the
entire dataset resulted in 31 players out of 46 (∼ 67%) to have a probability
and CI above chance.
and corporations [66]–[72]. Following these indications we
mapped the sell transactions to a reward signal to fit our
models. Finally, we hypothesise that not all players are short-
sighted, to test this we compare a full RL model (3 free
parameters) against a myopic model (2 free parameters, no
gamma). The difference is that the latter can be considered a
naı¨ve RL as it does not take into account future rewards, it
only seeks to maximise immediate rewards.
II. METHOD
A. Dataset
The dataset has been extracted from the publicly accessible
online trading simulation game VirtualTrader1, which is man-
aged by IEX Media Group BV in the Netherlands. Players can
subscribe for free and start playing the game with an assigned
virtual cash budget of 100k GBP. The players will then pick
the stocks they prefer from the FTSE100 stock index pool
(107 stocks at the time of data collection) and create their
own portfolio. These competitors are ranked according to the
return of their investment. This is composed of “holdings”
and “cash”. The former represent the shares possessed by a
player while the latter is the amount of money not invested (i.e.
deriving from sold stocks or never invested). The simulation
follows real world data evolution, for example price fluctua-
tions and price splits. The delay is usually in the order of 10-15
minutes and the player can access a visual representation of
the stocks time series. All the transactions are stored for each
player. For this study we considered transactions that span from
the 1st of January 2014 to the 31st of May 2014. This time
period has been chosen because at that time the player ranking
was determining the winner of the monthly prize giveaway.
1http://www.virtualtrader.co.uk - Copyright IEX Media Group BV
Two possible rewards can be identified: a psychological one,
consisting of the ranking position and a tangible one being the
prize for the highest achiever.
The transactions have been stored in a database in order
to be manipulated and used to fit models with different
combination of free parameters. The rows are structured in 6
fields: Date, Type, Stock, Volume, Price and Total. The dataset
initially contained about 100k transactions that were reduced
to about 1.4k. This was due to preprocessing, which removed
the many instances of inactive players who played only at
the beginning and/or at the end of the time frame considered.
In the final version of the dataset there are 46 players. The
average amount of transactions per player is 30. The player
who played the most during the six months performed 107
transactions. We considered the full amount of transactions
each player operated in the game.
B. Reinforcement Learning Setup
We adopted a widely used off-policy RL framework called
Q-learning [21]. The learning rule of this model is:
∆Q(st, at) = α
[
rt+1 + γmax
a
Q(st+1, a)−Q(st, at)
]
(1)
where Q(st, at) represents the value of action a while in
state s, at time t. α ∈ [0, 2] is the step-size parameter and
controls the rate of learning. γ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor
and represents how far-sighted the model is, It encodes how
much a future reward is worth at time t. When γ = 0 only
immediate rewards are taken into account by the player.
To test this framework the task has been mapped as follows.
There are two states (win, loss) calculated according to the
profit of the player (details in equations 6 and 7). These two
states reflect the dichotomy rooted in the Prospect Theory’s
value function gain/loss spectrum [73].
Since all players begin with the same initial budget our
calculation of the profit uses the returns accumulated by selling
stocks. This choice reduces the scope of the model, focusing on
the cash component of the players assets. This will be referred
to as the “Sell” model. The actions are mapped to the stocks
available for trading.
In order to avoid dimensionality issues, 107 stocks for 2
states give rise to 214 potential actions, we decided to classify
the stocks in 3 classes of risk using a widely used financial
modelling measure, CAPM Beta. The acronym stands for
Capital Asset Pricing Model, a model developed by Sharpe[74]
used to explain the relationship between the expected return of
a security and its risk . In this report we will refer to financial
volatility measure CAPM Beta as βF :
βF =
Cov(ra, rb)
V ar(rb)
(2)
This financial modelling measure quantifies the volatility
of a security in comparison to the market or a reference bench-
mark [75]. Relatively safe investments like utilities stocks (e.g.
gas and power) have a low βF , while high-tech stocks (e.g.
Nasdaq or MSH Morgan Stanley High-Tech) have a high βF .
As an example, the βF of the index of reference (that
represents the portion of the market considered) is exactly 1.
A βF ∈ (0, 1) indicates that the asset has a lower volatility
compared to the market or low correlation of the asset price
movements compared to the market. While if βF > 1 it
signifies an investment with higher volatility compared to
the benchmark. Following the previous example, high-tech
securities with a βF > 1 could yield better returns compared
to their benchmark index, when the market is going up. This
also poses more risk because in case the market loses value,
the security would lose value at a higher rate than the index.
βF is considered a measure of the systematic risk and can
be estimated by regression. Considering the returns of an asset
a and the returns of the corresponding benchmark b:
ra = α+ βrb (3)
βF has been calculated for each stock in the FTSE100
at the time of the game by considering daily returns in the
year between 1st June 2013 and 31st May 2014. The measure
associated with each stock is used to rank them and subdivide
them in three classes, containing respectively 36, 36 and 35
stocks each.
Reward r at time step t+ 1 is defined by the gain (or loss)
made in a sell transaction. Buying transactions are kept into
account to track players portfolios and to calculate the price
difference. They were not used as actions, but we might extend
our modelling scenario by integrating a “Buy” model in the
future and consider purchase actions by changing the reward
scheme. The reward is calculated as:
rt+1 = vt+1
(
pt+1 − 1
t
t∑
i=1
vipi
)
(4)
where vi and pi are the volume and the price of the stock
traded at the i-th time step. The second term of the difference
is a weighted average of the stock prices at previous times.
To avoid numerical instabilities, reward has been flattened
with a sigmoid function into the range [−1,+1]. Specifically
a hyperbolic tangent has been used, with ρ = 500 to capture
most of the variability of the rewards, only flattening the
extreme values. This choice is in line with prospect theory
value function which is concave for gains and convex for losses
[73].
tanh(r) =
1− e−r/ρ
1 + e−r/ρ
(5)
As in this study we focused on the sell subset of the players
interactions, the states are based solely on profit, which in turn
is based on the reward of the sell transactions. The profit and
states are defined as:
Profit =
∑
t
tanh(rt) (6)
State =
{
0, if Profit < 0.
1, otherwise.
(7)
The RL framework is composed of a learning model (eq.
1) and an action-selection model that is responsible for picking
the best action. In our setup the former is Q-learning and
the latter is Soft-Max. An action a is picked at time t with
probability:
P (at) =
eQt(a)β∑n
b=1 e
Qt(b)β
(8)
where n is the number of available actions (i.e. 3 in
this study) and β is the inverse temperature parameter and
represents the greediness of the action-selection model. In the
limit β → 0 the actions become equiprobable and the model
reverts to random. Higher values of β approximate a greedy
model which picks the best known action (fully exploitative).
The full model has 3 free parameters: α (step-size parameter
or learning rate), β (exploration-exploitation trade-off) and γ
(discount factor). For this study we used a bounded gradient
descent search with 27 combinations of initial guess points.
These are the combination of values of the free parameters
from where the search starts. By having different entry points
we hope to reduce the chance of the search getting stuck in a
local minimum solution. The search has been performed with
the following boundaries:
• α ∈ (0.0001, 2)
• β ∈ (0, 50)
• γ ∈ (0, 0.9999) (for the myopic model γ = 0)
The entry points are the combinations rising from the
following values:
• α ∈ {0, 0.5, 2}
• β ∈ {0, 25, 50}
• γ ∈ {0, 0.5, 0.9999}
The search results have been obtained on python 2.7.9
and scipy.optimize.minimize with scipy 0.17.1.
C. Model Testing Routine
Maximum Likelihood Estimate has been used as a measure
of the model fitness, following Daw’s comprehensive analysis
of methodology [76]. MLE is the appropriate method to
assess model performance because it evaluates which set of
model parameters are more likely to generate the data using a
probabilistic approach. Data likelihood is a powerful method
because it keeps into account the presence of noise in the
choices. It does so by using probability estimates for the
potential actions.
Given a model M and its corresponding set of parameters
θM the likelihood function is defined as P (D|M, θM ), where
D is the dataset (the list of choices and the associated rewards).
Applying Bayes’ rule:
P (θM |D,M) ∝ P (D|M, θM ) · P (θM |M) (9)
The left hand side of the proportionality is the posterior
probability distribution over the free parameters, given the data.
This quantity is proportional to the product of the likelihood
of the data, given the parameters and the prior probability of
the parameters. Treating the latter as flat we obtain that the
most probable value for θM (the best set of free parameters)
is the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE), that is the
set of parameter which maximises the likelihood function,
P (D|M, θM ) and it is commonly denoted θˆM . The likelihood
function is maximised through the following process. At each
timestep, for every action, the observation model (Soft-Max)
estimates a probability. These probabilities are then multiplied
together. To avoid numerical problems that could arise when
multiplying probabilities, the sum of their logarithm is cal-
culated instead. The negative of this value, also known as
Negative Log-Likelihood, is then used. The aim is then to
minimise this quantity, which is the equivalent of maximising
the likelihood function, P (D|M, θM ). In the future we will
refer to the Negative Log-Likelihood as MLE for simplicity,
keeping in mind that lower values represent better fit.
The values of MLE generated represent the goodness of fit
of the model with its associated set of parameters. To compare
the selected model with a random model and for statistical
significance we adopted the Likelihood Ratio Test [77]. This
statistical test uses the likelihood ratio to compare two nested
models and takes into account the different number of free
parameters of the two. It encapsulates this information, when
testing for significance, using the difference of the two amounts
as degrees of freedom for the chi-square (χ2) test. Since the
test statistic is distributed χ2 it is straightforward to estimate
the p-value associated with the χ2 value.
The baseline for comparison is a random model which
has 0 parameters as there is no learning involved and the
action-selection policy is random ( 13 chance of picking any
of the three stock bins). The first comparison is between this
random model and the simpler of the proposed models, which
has only two free parameters (γ = 0). This setup represent
the naı¨ve learning procedure that could explain investors’
behaviour showed in literature[57]. The full model, with all the
three free parameters, has also been tested against the myopic
model to assess whether some players are better fitted by a
more complex version of the framework. Finally the model
goodness of fit has been evaluated with the adopted action
classification (based on risk) against 500 randomly generated
stock classifications. This has been done to test the assumption
that players internally classify the stock range into discrete
degrees of risk.
III. RESULTS
Results for the test of the hypothesis that RL is a com-
ponent of decision making are shown in Fig. 1. The best set
of parameters was found according to MLE through gradient
descent search. The best model MLE has been compared to
the random model MLE using the Likelihood Ratio Test [77].
The random model MLE is easily estimated as:
P (D|Mrand) = log
Nt∏ 1
3
=
Nt∑
log
1
3
(10)
where Nt is the number of transactions for each player
in the dataset. As shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b) 15% of the
players in our dataset is better fitted by a myopic RL model
as opposed to a random model. In Fig. 1 (c) and (d) we report
an improvement in the fitting for some players using a full
RL model against the myopic (nested) version of the model.
This improvement is not reflected in the comparison of the full
RL model against the random model, as shown in Fig. 1 (e)
and (f). Most of the players that can be fitted with our models
are well represented by a myopic model. These results follow
what found by Choi et al.[57] and Huang et al. [58]. We made
the assumption that players, when faced with the choice to
trade many stocks (107 for this task), internally model these
in discrete groups of risk using readily available information
such as stock historical prices and returns, which in turn are
used to estimate their volatility (βF ). To test whether this
assumption holds true for the players in our dataset, we ran the
simpler version of our model on the risk-ranked discretisation
and on 500 independent and randomly scrambled discreti-
sations. The results are shown in Fig. 2 and are generated
using Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) as a measure for
comparison of fitness and Binomial Proportion Confidence In-
terval calculated with Clopper-Pearson method using Matlab
8.4.0.150421 (R2014b) function binofit. The BIC
has been used as the Likelihood Ratio Test can only be used to
compare nested models, while in this case the comparison is
between models with the same number of parameters that are
tested on different data arrangements. This procedure estimates
the probability that the ranked discretisation is better than the
500 scrambled discretisations (BICranked < BICs, where
BICs is the BIC for the s-th scrambled). The results shown
in Fig. 2 are for 99% confidence interval. The results shown
are only for those 7 players who are fitted significantly by the
myopic model. As shown in Fig. 2, all the players are well
above the chance threshold. This indicates that risk based on
historical data could be considered a proxy for action selection
for the players who are well fitted by our RL myopic model.
IV. CONCLUSION
We investigated a publicly available dataset consisting of
trading transactions operated by players of an investment game.
We based the discretisation of the actions on the assumption
that risk can capture the internal modelling that players operate
when facing this task. This assumption was shown to hold
true and be statistically significant for a subset of the players,
31 out of 46 and specifically for the 7 players who are best
fitted by a RL model. This could signify that the remaining
players might use other types of discretisation techniques based
on different measures (or a combination of them) or they do
not use technical analysis but fundamental analysis (e.g. using
financial statements and reports). In this work, we investigated
a model which combines two versions of a Reinforcement
Learning framework using Q-learning as an update rule and
Soft-Max as action-selection policy on a discretised action
space according to the risk measure βF . It is possible that
different model combinations, which use different learning
rules or different measures of risk, fit the players population in
our dataset better. It is also likely that, by restricting our focus
on the sell model, we missed some features of what constitutes
the reward signal that players receive. In the full version of the
game, in fact, players might try to maximise both holdings and
cash simultaneously, in order to compete in the ranking.
The myopic model is a nested version with only two free
parameters, representing the learning rate (α) and the degree
of greediness (β). The full version extends the simpler model
with a discount factor (γ) which regulates how much of the
future rewards is taken into account when updating the values
of present state-action pairs. 15% of the players are well
fitted by a RL model with γ = 0 and there is no significant
improvement of fitting by extending this model including
gamma as a free parameter. Previous literature pointed in the
direction of investors being naı¨ve (short-sighted) [57], [58]
and these results, albeit for a subset of the dataset, confirm
this indication. The hypothesis that RL is a component of the
decision making process for some investors is not confirmed
as either version of the tested model (short or far-sighted)
is statistically better than chance only for a subset of the
players. This subset, within this population, is not large enough
to draw a statistically meaningful positive result. By means
of a Binomial Proportion Confidence Interval calculated with
Clopper-Pearson method we get a negative result for the entire
population within a 99% confidence interval (Fig. 3 in the Ap-
pendix). While this exploratory study gives some perspectives
on how Reinforcement Learning can be used to model learning
and action-selection for investing problems, future work will
focus on different models and risk classification techniques as
well as on a deeper investigation of the typical parameters of
the best performing players and the correlation of different
strategies and performance of stock trading together with a
study of different RL models.
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APPENDIX
This manuscript is a correction to the article “Modelling
Stock-market Investors as Reinforcement Learning Agents” by
the same authors, issued in the proceedings of the 2015 IEEE
Conference on Evolving and Adaptive Intelligent Systems. The
corrections include fixing a bug in the script which estimated
the probabilities used in the calculation of model fitness. In
the previous work we applied some constraints and used a
different measure: the number of transactions considered for
each player was capped at 25 and the measure of risk used to
rank the stocks and classify them into discrete categories was
defined by the authors as:
R(sj) =
∣∣∣∣βF (sj) · σ(sj)maxσ(s)
∣∣∣∣ (11)
where βF is the financial modelling measure of volatility
of a security used in the present work, σ(sj) is the standard
deviation of the j-th stock and the maxσ(s) is the largest
standard deviation in the stock pool. This measure of riskiness
was used as it was believed to take into account the graphical
interpretation of the fluctuations in time series (σ) and the
overall trend of the security compared to the market (βF ).
Fig. 3. Population model fitting statistic using Binomial Proportion Con-
fidence Interval calculated with Clopper-Pearson method. The results are
negative as only 7 out of 46 players are better than random. The errorbar
represent the 99% confidence interval for the myopic model to be correctly
fitting the players in the dataset. As the errorbar lies entirely below chance
threshold we conclude that the models investigated do not correctly represent
the behaviour of the players in the data.
Fig. 4. Updated model comparison of Fig 1 (a) and (b) in the original paper.
This figure shows the comparison of the full RL model (grey bars) against the
random model (+ signs) according to their MLE. This is the same comparison
as in 1 (c) but for the original paper configuration: players transactions capped
at 25 and the combination of βF and σ, as in Eq. 11, used to determine stocks
risk degree and their classification. In this case the portion of players captured
by the full RL model is only 8% (4 players, 14, 18, 24, 26). Only 2 players
are captured by the myopic model (14 and 18).
Fig. 5. Updated model comparison of Fig 1 (c) and (d) in the original paper.
This figure shows the comparison of the full RL model (grey bars) against
the myopic model (filled diamonds signs) according to their MLE. This is the
same comparison as in 1 (b) but for the original paper configuration: players
transactions capped at 25 and the combination of βF and σ, as in Eq. 11,
used to determine stocks risk degree and their classification. The 4 players
who are significantly better fitted by a full model are 14, 21, 24, 26.
